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THE COURT OF APPEALS, 1953 TERM
suoh minimum figures was arbitrary and out of harmony with the
expressed statutory mandate to tax only that portion of the receipt properly attributable to business done within the state.
In Claim of Gold,4 1 the State Industrial Commissioner's regulations for the ascertainment of gratuities includable in employee
remuneration for the purpose of computing unemployment insurance benefits were found defective. 2 In consonance with the statutory mandate 3 of formiulating and promulgating all regulations
necessary to carry out the Unemployment Insurance Law," the
Commissioner declared that determination of the amount of gratuities earned by hotel chambermaids would be made by means of
the filing by the chambermaids of a signed statement of the amount
so received with her employer, after having been duly notified of
such requirement by the employer. If no such statement should
be filed, the amount of gratuities should be deemed to be "nil".
In the instant case, the chambermaid's employer did not
notify her of this requirement and she submitted no statement of
gratuities. Hence when she applied for unemployment insurance
benefits, she discovered that the $400 in gratuities she had in
fact received over the time in question were excluded from the
computation of her benefits, even though she worked in a hotel
known to be one of the type where tipping of chambermaids is
common (the so-called American Plan hotels). The court decided
that in view of the mandatory duty imposed upon him by § 5174r
to determine the amount of gratuities, it was unreasonable and
arbitrary for the Commissioner to penalize the employee by invoking a presumption that such gratuities were nil where he had
done nothing more to determine the fact than to instruct the employer to do so, and the latter had in fact failed to do so.
Statutory Construction
In two cases, the Court of Appeals was called upon to construe
Federal statutes in regard to housing. In Peters v. New York City
41. 307 N. Y. 224. 120 N. E. 2d 799 (1954).

42. § 517 of the Labor Law, defining remuneration to employees, includes as such
remuneration gratuities received by employees in the course of their work. Hence
such gratuities are includable for purposes of computing unemployment insurance benefits
under §590 (2). The employer is therefore obligated to include the amount of such
gratuities in his' payroll for the purpose of ascertaining the amount he is required to

contribute under § 570(1).
43. LABOR LAw § 530(1).
44. LABOR LAw Art. 18.

45. "Where gratuities are received by an employee in the course of his employment from a person other than his employer, the value of such gratuities shal be determined by the commissioner and be deemed and included as part of his remuneration
paid by his employer." [Emphasis added.]
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Housing Authority,, the so-called Gwinn Amendment4 7 to the

United States Housing Act of 193748 was involved. That enactment amended the Housing Act to provide that "no housing unit
constructed under the United States Housing Act of 1937, as
amended, shall be occupied by a person who is a member of an
organization designated as subversive by the Attorney General:
Providedfurther, that the foregoing prohibition shall be enforced
by the local housing authority." In accordance with the latter
directive, the New York City Housing Authority issued the following resolution: "No applicant shall be admitted to, and no
tenant shall be permitted to continue to reside in . . . a federally

aided project" unless the applicant should sign a certificate to the
effect that he is not a member of an organization designated by the
Attorney General as subversive.
Petitioners brought an action to annul this requirement and
it was granted in the first instance on the ground that the resolution was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable and violated due
process in that the proscribed organizations were placed on the
Attorney General's list without benefit of hearing.49 The Appellate Division modified by striking the petition for relief, holding
that, since affected organizations were at the present time being
given hearings, the constitutional argument was no longer tenable. 0 'The Court of Appeals held that the constitutional question could not then be decided, under the doctrine that courts will
not pass on the constitutionality of acts of legislatures until such
action becomes absolutely necessary." Instead, two non-constitutional grounds were found on which to base the decision. The
Federal statute apnlied only in the case of housing units constructed under the United States Housing Act, not, as intimated by
the resolution, to federally aided projects. Though it was admitted that the units in question were built partially with Federal
funds, it. had not been determined whether they were built under
the Housing Act; until this determination was made, it could not
be determined whether the Gwinn Amendment applied. The second ground was that the Housing Authority resolution required
non-membership in all organizations on the Attorney General's
46. 307 N. Y. 519, 121 N. E. 2d 529 (1954).
47. 66 STAT. 403 (1953), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1411c.
48. 50 STAT. 888 (1937) as amended, 42 U. S. C. A. § 1401 et seq.
Misc.
_, 128 N. Y. S.
49. Petersv. New York City Housing Authority, 2d 224 (1953).
50. Peters v. New York City Housing Authority, 283 App. Div. 801, 128 N. Y. S.
2d 712 (1954).
51. Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles, 331 U. S. 549 (1947), Lynbrook Gardens v. Ullman, 291 N.Y. 472, 53 N.E. 2d 353 (1943).

THE COURT OF APPEALS, 1953 TERM
list, not merely those described as "subversive"
the Gwinn Amendment.

52

as provided by

In Hutchins v. McGoldrick, the de-control provisions of the
State Residential Rent Lawv5 came into question. In each of the
two cases property was involved which had been converted to residential property after Feb. 1, 1947 and before May 1, 1950. Section 2(2) of the Rent Law defines "housing accommodation" and
excepts from that classification a number of accommodations
among which is the following:
. (2)
(g) housing accommodations . . . which are .
additional housing accommodations created by conversion on
or after Feb. 1, 1947; provided, however, that any housing
accommodation created as a result of any conversion . . . on

or after fay 1, 1950 shall continue to be subject to rent control
as provided herein unless the commission issues an order decontrolling them which it shall do if there has been a structural

change involving substantial alterations or remodeling; and
such change has resulted in additional housing accommodations
consisting of self-contained family units as defined by regulations issued by the commission . ..
"Self-contained family unit" is defined as a "housing accommorooms in addidation with private access, containing one or more
55
tionto a kitchen . . . and a private bathroom."1

The apartments created by conversion in the first case did
not contain private bathrooms and those in the second case came
about as a result of very minor structural changes. The apartments in both cases had been under Federal rent control prior to
May 1, 1950.5(
-

In a strictly literal reading of the State control law, the majority of the Court of Appeals, speaking through Chief Judge
Lewis, decided that the accommodations in question were exempt
from control as falling within the first clause of section 2(g) (2),
since they had been converted subsequent to Feb. 1, 1947 and prior
to May 1, 1950. The fact that these premises had been under
Federal rent control was held to be immaterial, on the ground
that the State law was complete in itself and made no reference in
52. The list included six categories: Totalitarian; Fascist; Communist; Subversive; Organizations which have 'adopted a policy of advocating or approving the commission of acts of force and violence to deny others their rights under the Constitution
of the United States'; and Organizations which 'seek to alter the form of Government
of the United States by unconstitutional means' 5 CODE FED. RGs., APP. A, p. 203.
53. 307 N.Y. 78, 120 N.E. 2d 335 (1954) (two cases).
54. L. 1946, c. 274, as amended by L. 1950, c. 250, McK. UNCONSOL. LAWS § 8581

et seq.

55. McK. UNCONSOL. LAWS, APPENDIX § 11.
56. 61 STAT. 193 (1947) as amended, 50 U. S. C. A. § 1891 et seq.
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this connection to the Federal act which had controlled up to April
30, 1950. Judge Conway, with whom Judge Van Voorhis concurred, dissented, pointing out that the Legislature had declared
that its intent in passing this statute was to control those same
accommodations which had been governed by the Federal law. 7
It was also pointed out that the purpose in exempting converted
housing accommodations from rent control in both the State and
Federal acts was to encourage such conversions to alleviate the
housing shortage; but that the Federal act manifested an intention to exempt only those accommodations which constituted selfcontained family units,55 and that decontrolling units under the
State act which do not meet these standards is a violation of the
Legislature's expressed intent to keep under control those accommodations which were controlled by the Federal act.
It would seem that the exactly literal reading of the State
control statute has resulted in a frustration of the intent of the
Legislature to afford a smooth changeover from Federal to State
control. A reading of the statute in par materia with that which
it is designed to succeed would seem the more warranted procedure.
Scope of Review
a. Forms of review: Under C.P.A., Article 78, the classifications and forms of the writs of certiorari to review, mandamus and
prohibition have been abolished.5 9 However, in adjudicating relief
in Article 78 proceedings, these forms are still relevant in determining the type of relief to be granted.60
In Gimprich v. Board of Education of City of New York,06 a
schoolteacher brought an Article 78 proceeding in the nature of
mandamus to compel the respondent to grant her two years' salary credit for outside teaching experience. The petitioner would
be entitled to relief in the nature of a writ of mandamus if the
respondent was under a statutory duty to grant such relief.02
However, such relief will not be granted if the respondent is vested
with an exercise of discretion.

3

57. McK. UNCONSOL. LAWS § 8594(1).
58. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1892(c) (3).
59. C. P. A. § 1283.
60. Newbrand v. City of Yonkers, 285 N.Y. 164, 33 N.E. 2d 75 (1941).
61. 306 N.Y. 401. 118 N.E. 2d 578 (1954).
62. Strum v. Board of Education of City of New York, 301 N.Y. 803, 96 N.E.
2d 192 (1950), Wakefield v. Board of Education of City of New York, 192 Misc. 639, 79
N. Y. S. 2d 420 (Sup. Ct. 1948), modified 274 App. Div. 884, 84 N. Y. S. 2d 700 (lst
Dep't 1948), aff'd 299 N. Y. 664, 87 N. E. 2d 58 (1949).
63. People ex rel. Hammond v. Leonard. 74 N.Y. 443 (1878), Hanson v. Teacher's
Retirement Board, 236 App. Div. 589, 260 N.Y. Supp. 481 (1st Dep't 1932), aff'd 262
N.Y. 496, 188 N.E. 36 (1933).

